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ARTICLE 
IS WHAT WE WANT WHAT WE NEED, AND CAN WE GET 
IT IN WRITING? THE THIRD-WAVE OF FEMINISM HITS 
THE BEACH OF MODERN PARENTAGE PRESUMPTIONS 
By: Justice Carol A. Beier and Larkin E. Walsh 
Modern statutes on parentage regarding artificial 
insemination and the cases that have interpreted them reflect 
the explosion of family gender roles by second-wave feminism. 
Although a natural father now is generally expected to share 
the rights and obligations of parentage with a natural mother, 
this is not so if he is a mere contributor of biological material. 
Are the modern presumptions underlying such statutes, what 
we used to want, what we have come to need? Or, is current 
law too much a reflection of the essentialism for which the 
second-wave is sometimes justly criticized? 
Third-wave individualism and resistance to inflexible 
doctrine supply interesting lenses for an examination of the 
developing law in this area. Particularly, a recent Kansas 
1 
case, In the Interest of K.MH., is the first to evaluate a statute 
designed to give power to individual choice by making a 
parentage presumption secondary to an agreement between a 
woman and a sperm donor that the donor will be treated as a 
parent. 
This paper explores the context and outcome of this case 
and whether we have exhausted the limits of legal reform that 
can be achieved through the creation of-even progressive -
presumptions about parentage. Given the changes wrought 
under the influence of the second-wave, do such presumptions 
retain vitality and usefulness? Or, do they produce only a 
different, but not necessarily better, set of obstacles to 
formation and preservation of individual families and their 
informed choices? 
I 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007). 
26 
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THE SETTING FOR K.MH. 
The primary parentage presumption common in American law before the advent of second-wave feminism in the 1960s was 
based on Victorian separate spheres ideology and concurrent relative 
ignorance of the science of human reproduction. 2 Separate spheres 
mandated that women and men occupy distinct cultural sectors: 
women - at least those of a certain race and class - were destined by 
biology to keep house and bear and rear children. Men were likewise 
destined by biology; but their lot was to control everything 
extrafamilial, i.e., all other social, political, and commercial human 
• • 3 
mteractIOns. 
The nuclear family on which this ideology was built received 
reinforcement from law while science developed. Motherhood was an 
observable, verifiable fact. Fatherhood was not. Discriminating blood 
typing and DNA tests that would make a man's responsibility for a 
pregnancy certain were many years in the future. In the meantime, 
identification of fathers must be accomplished in another way. 
Lord Mansfield's rule fit the bill nicely.4 The rule established a 
legal presumption that a woman's husband was the father of any child 
born during the couple's marriage, regardless of evidence to the 
contrary, and guaranteed the child's legitimacy. 5 This met polite 
society's demand for legal certainty when no biological certainty was 
yet possible. Like all legal fictions, the presumption relied on the 
unspoken premises that pattern what was possible and desirable and 
that its general usefulness and predictability trumped any specific and 
potentially messy inaccuracy. True enough or often enough would be 
good enough. 
The second-wave of the American feminist movement - and the 
legal reform designed to undermine and further it - had its 
inadequacies and sometimes painful internal divisions, but it 
succeeded in at least one dramatic and overdue way: it identified the 
rigid gender roles of separate spheres ideology as the potential - and 
choice-throttling oppressions they were. As it happened, it did so at 
roughly the same time that scientific advances rendered traditional 
2 See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women's 
Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, 117, 
118 (David Kairys ed., 1982). 
3 See, e.g., id. at 117-24. 
4 Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1 UTAH L. 
REV. 93, 117 n.86 (1996). 
5 See Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777) (neither spouse's testimony can be 
admitted to "bastardize the issue born after marriage"); see also Brashier, supra note 4, at 117 
nn.85-87. 
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sexual intercourse unnecessary for human procreation.6 One of those 
advances, artificial insemination, initially used almost exclusively to 
treat infertility in married heterosexual couples,7 has now moved far 
beyond that limitation. Of course, the law has had to move with it. 
One of the earliest of those moves came from the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws when, in 1973, 
it promulgated the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).8 Containing a 
provision specifically designed to address the parentage of children 
born through artificial insemination, 1973 UP A incorporated two rigid 
presumptions, one old and one new: paternity of a husband and non-
paternity of a sperm donor. Section 5 read: 
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of 
her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man 
not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural 
father of a child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in 
writing and signed by him and his wife. The physician shall certify their 
signatures and the date of the insemination, and file the husband's consent 
with the [State Department of Health], where it shall be kept confidential 
and in a sealed file. However, the physician's failure to do so does not 
affect the father and child relationship. All papers and records pertaining to 
the insemination, whether part of the permanent record of a court or of a file 
held by the supervising physician or elsewhere, are subject to inspection 
only upon an order of the court for good cause shown. 
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial 
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in 
law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.9 
The majority of states that have adopted similar legislation have 
based their language directly on 1973 UP A and its two presumptions. 10 
The husband of an artificially inseminated married woman bears all 
rights and obligations of paternity as to any child conceived, 
regardless of whether the sperm used was his own or a donor's.11 
6 See Brashier, supra note 4, at 181 n.288 and accompanying text (citing WILFRED J. 
FEINGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 59, 63 (2d ed. 1976)); Vern L. Bullough, Artificial 
Insemination (2004), http://www.glbtq.com/socialsciences/ artificiaUnsemination.html. 
7 Bullough, supra note 6. 
8 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, (amended 2000), 9B U.L.A. 407, 407-08 (2001). 
9Id. 
10 See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1992) (identical); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 2007) 
(same); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West 2004) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (2007) 
(same); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 126.061 (LexisNexis 2004) (same); see also OR. REv. STAT. 
§ 109.239 (2007). Other states still have no legislation in this area, including Hawaii, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia. 
11 ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-9-201, 202, 209 (2004); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2004) (requires husband's 
consent); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (2007) (prevents husband's disavowal); MD. CODE 
ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206 (LexisNexis 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 
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Meanwhile, a sperm donor for artificial insemination of a married 
woman will not be treated in law as if he were the father of her child, 
if he is not the woman's husband. 12 This design, according to 1973 
UPA's drafters, was intended to protect the expectations of married 
couples, the expectations of sperm donors, and the best interests of any 
children conceived. 13 Conspicuously absent from 1973 UP A's 
language and the drafters' concerns were unmarried women. 
The earliest case to address this gap, although post-1973 UPA, 
arose in a state with, at the time, no legislation regarding artificial 
insemination. In that case, eM v. ee/4 a known donor brought an 
action to obtain visitation with the child that resulted when an 
unmarried woman artificially inseminated herself with his sperm. The 
court ruled in his favor, effectively extending Lord Mansfield's rule to 
this new type of unmarried "couple." In its view, the donor was the 
"natural father" of the "illegitimate child," because evidence 
established that the donor and the woman had intended to act as 
parents together. 
The National Conference ultimately undertook revision of its 
model statute, resulting in the 2000 UP A. The revised version of 1973 
UPA's § 5, now denominated § 702, states simply: "A donor is not a 
parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.,,15 The 
influence of second-wave feminism can be seen in at least two of four 
policy choices - actually, implicit presumptions - underlying the 
2000 UP A language. First, the language reflects relaxation of 
previously harsh societal judgment of single motherhood by choice; § 
702 no longer differentiates between married and unmarried women 
who undergo artificial insemination. Second, the statute is silent on 
the biological sex of the donor, meaning it may be applied to a donor 
of eggs as well as sperm; this gender neutrality, although the subject of 
no small amount of criticism, is the calling card of one branch of 
second-wave feminism and law reform. The second and third policy 
choices are inherent in the statute's absence of a legal distinction 
1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49A-l (West 
2007) (requires husband's consent); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 551-56 (West 2007) (does 
not contemplate unmarried recipient); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (2006) (requires 
husband's consent). But see Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 390 (2005); Hernandez 
v. Robles, 794 N'y.S.2d 579, 587 (2005). 
12 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-771 (West 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405 
(2002); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.95 (LexisNexis 2003); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.239 
(2007). 
13 See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 8, cmt.; Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, 
Rights and Obligations Resulting from Human Artificial Insemination, 83 A.L.R. 4th 295, 
301-04,321-22 (1991). 
14 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. 1977). 
15 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 8, § 702. 
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between known and anonymous donors and its lack of an escape 
clause to enable an agreement to share parenting rights and 
responsibilities. 16 
Even before the 2000 UP A amendment, the states had begun to 
catch on to the presumption's failure to account for unmarried women. 
Several modified their statutes to remove the requirement that an 
artificially inseminated woman be married to someone other than the 
sperm donor before the presumption of donor non-paternity would 
apply. 17 
In addition, courts in four states decided cases interpreting 
artificial insemination statutes containing absolute bars to donor 
paternity. Each of these cases arose after a known donor alleged that 
he had agreed to share parenting with the unmarried woman who 
conceived through insemination with his sperm. 
In the first of these cases, Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 18 a California 
donor provided semen to a woman who planned to raise any child 
conceived with a female partner. The statute required involvement by 
a physician in the procedure, but the woman did not use one. The 
court relied on this deviation from statutory procedure to rule that the 
presumption of donor non-fatherhood would not apply and awarded 
the donor visitation rights. The court also held that the physician 
involvement requirement did not infringe on the woman's rights, and 
it concluded it was not necessary to reach the donor's constitutional 
claims. 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon and the Supreme Court of 
Colorado each decided an artificial insemination case in 1989. In the 
Oregon case, McIntyre v. Crouch,19 the donor sought to establish 
paternity based on an agreement with the woman inseminated, but she 
argued that any agreement between them was irrelevant because of the 
statute's absolute bar to donor paternity. The court ruled in the 
donor's favor. In its view, the statute raised no equal protection 
problem but would violate due process as applied to the donor if he 
could establish the existence of an agreement to share in parenting. 
16 As of March 2008, four states have adopted the 2000 UPA language. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 13, § 8-702 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-60 (2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
160.702 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 788-15-702 (2008). 
17 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2004); 750 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 40/3(b) 
(LexisNexis 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(2) (West 1997) (same); see also COLO. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(2) (West 2005) (substantially similar); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-
775 (West 2007) (similar); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405 (2002) (similar); OHIO REv. CODE 
ANN. § 3111.95(8) (LexisNexis 2003) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(A)(3) (West 2004) 
(substantially similar). 
18 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986). 
19 780 P.2d 239, rev. denied, 308 Or. 593, cert. denied 495 U.S. 905 (1989). 
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In the Colorado decision, In the Interest of R.c.,20 the court was less 
specific about the theory underlying its ruling, but it also held that an 
absolute bar statute could not apply constitutionally if a known donor 
had reached an agreement to parent with the woman to be inseminated. 
It remanded for evidence on whether such an agreement existed in that 
case. 
The fourth case arising before the 2000 UP A amendment, C. 0. v. 
Ws.,21 out of Ohio, also resulted in a holding that an artificial 
insemination statute absolutely barring donor paternity would be 
unconstitutional if applied to a situation in which the donor and the 
artificially inseminated woman agreed he would act as a parent.22 
The last case to enrich the setting for K.MH. arose after the 2000 
amendment to UP A in California. That case, Steven S. v. Deborah 
D.,23 involved an unmarried woman and a known donor married to 
another woman. The woman and the donor were unsuccessful at their 
first effort at artificial insemination. They then attempted to conceive 
through sexual intercourse, again unsuccessfully. A second artificial 
insemination was successful. There was no evidence of an agreement 
between the woman and the donor concerning the donor's role in the 
resulting child's life. The court rejected the donor's equitable estoppel 
argument and did not reach his equal protection and due process 
challenges, applying the absolute bar of the statute, fully engaging the 
presumption of donor non-paternity. 
As the law shifted, so did feminism. The emergence of a third, 
distinct feminist "wave" is frequently associated temporally with the 
fall 1991 spectacle of now-Associate Justice Clarence Thomas' 
confirmation hearings before the United States Senate, which 
examined Professor Anita Hill's allegations of sexual harrassment. 
The tone of the hearings made it painfully clear that the second-wave 
had yet to make the workplace generally, or Capitol Hill in particular, 
places where equal treatment was assured. 24 This was a shock to 
20 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989). 
21 639 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio Ct. Com. PI. 1994). 
22 Since the 2000 UP A amendment, one state has decided two more cases addressing a 
statute with an absolute bar to donor paternity; but the cases added little to the legal landscape 
because their resolutions hinged only on standing. See In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33 (Tex. 
App. 2006) (known donor lacked standing to pursue parentage adjudication; child conceived 
through assisted reproduction by unmarried donor's sister's same-sex partner using donor's 
sperm); see also In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App. 2005) (known donor had standing 
to maintain paternity action; parties had signed preinsemination agreement stating donor 
would be treated as ifhe and the child's mother were married). 
23 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482 (2005). 
24 DEBORAH SEIGEL, SISTERHOOD, INTERRUPTED: FROM RADICAL WOMEN TO GRRLS GONE 
WILD 110-15, 127-28 (2007); see also ASTRID HENRY, NOT My MOTHER'S SISTER: 
GENERATIONAL CONFLICT AND THIRD-WAVE FEMINISM 16-23 (2004). 
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young women who had grown up with feminism "in the water.,,25 
With all of the work of the second-wave, and many of its initiatives in 
place, it was clear there was more to be done. Rebecca Walker's 1992 
Ms. essay discussing the Thomas-Hill events, narrated the disconnect. 
She declared, "I am not a post-feminism feminist; I am the third-
wave.,,26 
Academic and other discourse from without and within the 
women's movement, always lively and sometimes sharply critical,27 
became so pointed as to qualify as incendiary. Some argued that 
feminists of the second-wave had betrayed women.28 From their 
perspective, the movement had become too abstract, too intellectual, 
too removed from real life struggles and everyday concerns. 29 It had 
assumed and perpetuated essentialist views of women and their 
concerns, a new but nevertheless destructive set of stereotypes. A 
woman who truly and fundamentally embraced the notion of equality, 
should not align herself with this reformulated institution of "feminism 
- the f-word." As a classification, it was ultimately damaging, 
undermining, artificial, unnecessary, unhelpfu130 and psychologically, 
at least, oppressive.31 The daughters of the second-wave - this third-
wave - balked at being ushered across any threshold based on their 
gender alone. 32 The ushering felt more like a push, regardless of their 
desire to move in the direction mapped by their mothers. They 
rejected any assumption that their sex or their identity as feminists 
25 SEIGEL, supra note 24, at 98; JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER & AMy RICHARDS, MANIFESTA: 
YOUNG WOMEN, FEMINISM, AND THE FUTURE 83 (2000) (referring to Marlo Thomas' 1973 
album, video, and book, Free to Be . .. You and Me). 
26 See HENRY, supra note 24, at 23. Other significant events raised cultural awareness of 
the persistent and pervasive problem of domestic violence, marital rape, forced abortion, such 
as the 1993 trial and acquittal of Lorena Bobbitt, who in 1993, severed her husband's penis 
after he raped her; the 1991 confession of serial killer Aileen Wuomos; and Mike Tyson's 
1991 arrest for the rape of Miss Black America. 
27 See, e.g., Nadine Taub, Thoughts on Living and Moving with the Recurring Divide, 24 
GA. L. REv. 965, 965-69 (1990). 
28 See generally KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON 
CAMPUS (1993) (accusing second-wave rape-crisis activists of perpetuating an ideology of 
women as passive, victimized, helpless innocents); see also NAOMI WOLF, FIRE WITH FIRE: 
THE NEW FEMALE POWER AND How IT WILL CHANGE THE 21 ST CENTURY (1993) (rejecting 
"victim feminism"); RENE DENFELD, THE NEW VICTORIANS: A YOUNG WOMAN'S CHALLENGE 
TO THE OLD FEMINIST ORDER (1995) (rejecting Victorian notions advocating political 
helplessness); CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, WHO STOLE FEMINISM? How WOMEN HAVE 
BETRAYED WOMEN (1994); SEIGEL, supra note 24, at 100-01, 121, 130; BAUMGARDER, supra 
note 25, at 236-54; HENRY, supra note 24, at 28,50, 102-05. 
29 DENFELD, supra note 28, at 5. 
30 SEIGEL, supra note 24, at 114-16. 
31Id. at 119. 
32 I d. at 7, 105. 
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meant they automatically agreed with some preconceived set of values 
or goals.33 
This individualism poses an interesting conundrum for law refonn. 
Third-wave feminists shrewdly discern that it has limits for achieving 
feminist goals of transfonnation and autonomy for individual, real 
women;34 because much of the law is structured on presumptions, 
generalizations about the desires of individuals, and the patterns most 
helpful to achieving them. 
Bridget Crawford posits that the third-wave's reclamation of 
feminism through engagement with the media is powerful "cultural 
work" that may be a necessary pre-condition to an evolution in the 
law,35 and she predicts that "third-wave engagement with culture may 
be a precursor to the law's adoption of some third-wave feminist 
ideas.,,36 In essence, the thesis is that the media are tools to produce 
cultural infrastructure, without which even the best intentioned and 
artfully designed legal refonns are ineffective. For example, women 
may now have the legal right to enter into contracts, but exercise of 
that right requires extralegal recognition that women, in fact, have 
power to bargain and to control something worth bargaining for. 
IN THE INTEREST OF K.MH. 
Kansas adopted certain portions of 1973 UP A in 198537 but did not 
legislate on artificial insemination until 1994.38 At that point, drafters 
departed from the UPA design in two respects: (1) they made no 
distinction between married and unmarried women undergoing the 
procedure, and (2) they specifically provided that a woman and a 
spenn donor could agree in writing to escape the legal presumption of 
donor non-paternity. The statute, Kansas Statute Annotated § 38-
1114(0, thus reads: 
The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial 
insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if 
33 See Ann Ferguson, Moral Responsibility and Social Change: A New Theory of Self, 12 
HYPATIA 116,133 (Summer 1997). 
34 Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, 
Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. 1. GENDER & L. 99, 159 (2007) 
(applauding the Manifesta 's authors' demand we "make explicit that the fight for reproductive 
rights must include birth control," but critiquing their failure to evaluate "the existing state of 
the law and how the current jurisprudential framework mayor may not be adequate for 
achieving this goal"). 
35/d. at 162. 
36Id. at 162-63. 
37 See H.B. 2012,1985 Leg., ch. 114 (Kan. 1985). 
38 See H.B. 2583, 1994 Leg., ch. 292 (Kan. 1994) (now codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
1 1 14(f) (2000)). 
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he were not the birth father of a child thereby conceived, unless agreed to in 
writing by the donor and the woman. 39 
The second drafting difference would eventually tell the tale in the 
Kansas Supreme Court's 2007 decision in K.MH., which involved an 
unmarried woman, S.H., who desired to become a mother through 
artificial insemination by a known donor. 40 She approached a friend, 
D.H., who agreed to participate. 41 S.H. and D.H. entered into no 
written agreement on the donation, the insemination, or their 
expectations with regard to D.H.'s parental rights or lack thereof.42 
S.H. gave birth to twins, K.M.H. and K.C.H.43 The day after their 
delivery, S.H. filed an action to terminate D.H.'s parental rights.44 
D.H. responded in the case initiated by S.H. and filed a separate action 
to establish his paternity; he acknowledged financial responsibility and 
sought joint custody and visitation.45 After the actions were 
consolidated, S.H. moved to dismiss the paternity action, relying on 
the absence of a written agreement under the statute. 46 D.H. asserted 
that he and S.H. had an oral agreement that he would be a father to the 
• 47 
twms. 
D.H. challenged the constitutionality of the statute on both equal 
protection and due process grounds, citing the California, Oregon, and 
Ohio cases interpreting absolute bar statutes.48 A majority of the court 
distinguished those cases because of the Kansas statute's provision 
permitting participants in artificial insemination to opt out of the donor 
non-paternity presumption through a written agreement. 49 Such a 
statute had not yet been "subjected ... to a constitutional crucible,,50 in 
any state. 
On equal protection, the majority opinion echoed the debate of 
equal-treatment and special-treatment feminist legal scholars of the 
second-wave,51 acknowledging that: 
39 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(f) (2000). 
40 In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1029 (Kan. 2007). 
41 Id 
42/d. 
43/d. 
44 Id. 
45 In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1029 (Kan. 2007). 
46 /d. 
47 Id 
48 Id 
49/d. 
50 Jd. at 1083 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (2002); FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2005); 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:3(I)(e) (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (2002); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6(B) (2006)). 
51 See, e.g., Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, 
and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 175, 194-196 (1982). 
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K.S.A. 38-1114(t) draws a gender-based line between a necessarily 
female sperm recipient and a necessarily male sperm donor for an artificial 
insemination. By operation of the statute, the female is a potential parent or 
actual parent under all circumstances; by operation of the same statute, the 
male will never be a potential parent or actual parent unless there is a 
written agreement to that effect with the female. 52 
This statutory distinction survived the intennediate equal 
protection scrutiny applied to such gender classifications, the majority 
held, because sex difference transcended mere societal construction: 
"[G]iven the biological differences between females and males and the 
immutable role those differences play in conceiving and bearing a 
child, regardless of whether conception is achieved through sexual 
intercourse or artificial insemination," it was unlikely that S.H. and 
D.H. were truly similarly situated. 53 
Even if that analytical hurdle could have been overcome, the 
majority stated, several legitimate legislative purposes or important 
governmental objectives were served by Kansas Statute Annotated § 
38-1114(f).54 The statute facilitated an individual married or unmarried 
woman's choice to become a parent without engaging in sexual 
intercourse, either because of personal choice or because a husband or 
partner was infertile, impotent, or ill.55 It encouraged 
able and willing men to donate sperm to such women by protecting them 
from later unwanted claims for support from the mothers or the children. 
The statute protects women recipients as well, preventing potential claims 
of donors to parental rights and responsibilities, in the absence of an 
agreement. Its requirement that any such agreement be in writing enhances 
predictability, clarity, and enforceability. . .. Effectively, the parties must 
decide whether they will enter into a written agreement before any donation 
is made, while there is still balanced bargaining power on both sides of the 
parenting equation.56 
The majority then addressed D.H.'s due process claim. 57 D.H. had 
conceded that the statute's provision for lifting the statutory 
presumption of donor non-paternity through written agreement meant 
it would survive due process scrutiny as applied to an anonymous 
sperm donor. 58 However, he asserted it could not be constitutionally 
applied to him, a known donor, because it deprived a biological father 
52 In re K.MH., at 1039. 
53Id. 
54Id. 
55Id. 
56ld. 
57 In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025,1040 (Kan. 2007). 
58Id. 
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of his parental rights without notice and a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard. 59 
The majority agreed that an absolute-bar statute such as those at 
issue in the earlier California, Oregon, Colorado, and Ohio cases 
would lead to due process concerns.60 But it upheld the Kansas statute 
and its application to D.H., ruling that the requirement of a writing to 
memorialize any agreement between a woman and a sperm donor 
denied D.H. no procedural right. 61 Rather, his own inaction before 
donating merely set up a burden of proof that he was unable to meet.62 
The court also rejected D.H. 's argument that the statute inevitably 
made the woman who is inseminated the sole arbiter of whether a 
donor can become a father to a child his sperm helps conceive.63 
While this may be true after a donation has been made, up until that 
point, a prospective donor would retain complete autonomy; he could 
refuse to facilitate the procedure unless the woman agreed to paternity 
on his terms.64 
The majority also rejected D.H. 's due process claim to the extent it 
rested upon substantive rather than procedural grounds.65 It held: 
We simply are not persuaded that the requirement of a writing transforms 
what is an otherwise constitutional statute into one that violates D.H.'s 
substantive due process rights. Although we agree ... that one goal of the 
Kansas Parentage Act as a whole is to encourage fathers to voluntarily 
acknowledge paternity and child support obligations, the obvious impact of 
the plain language of this particular provision in the Act is to prevent the 
creation of parental status where it is not desired or expected . . .. [The 
statute] ensures no attachment of parental rights to sperm donors in the 
absence of a written agreement to the contrary; it does not cut off rights that 
have already arisen and attached. 
Weare confident this legislative design realizes the expectation of unknown 
or anonymous sperm donors .. " To the extent it does not realize the 
expectation of a known sperm donor, the statute tells him exactly how to 
opt out, how to become and remain a father. 66 
59/d. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62/d. 
63 In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1040 (Kan. 2007). 
64 /d. at 1041. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1040-41 (emphasis in original). Two Kansas Court of Appeals judges, sitting by 
designation, dissented in In re K.MH. They would have ruled that the statute violated due 
process as applied to D.H., because of his allegation that an oral agreement existed. They 
assumed that D.H. had a fundamental right to be a father arising out of his biological 
connection to the twins and could not be deprived of it without an active waiver. Id. at 1047-
50 (Caplinger, 1., dissenting, joined by Hill, J.). One of the judges also wrote separately, 
arguing the majority's interpretation of KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(f) did violence to half of 
the twins' heritage. Id. at 1051 (Hill, J., dissenting). 
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K.MH AND FEMINISM 
The sensibility that animates third-wave feminism is evident in 
both the Kansas statute applied in K.MH. and the reasoning of the 
decision. Although certain aspects of both may continue to rely on 
patterns and presumptions, in our view, they are consistent with the 
positive power and individualism that are hallmarks of feminism's 
third-wave. 
Both the statute and majority opinion operate from a position of 
comfort with a contract model for formation and preservation of 
parental rights. Under this model, the parties are free to elect, in 
writing, the family structure they desire. 
This freedom would not be possible but for the deconstruction of 
Victorian separate spheres family life accomplished during the second-
wave. The gender determinism from that ideology had to be attacked 
and destroyed. But we note that the statute and K.MH avoid any 
second-wave trap of essentialist insistence on what any person, female 
or male, should want or must have as a replacement. 
This freedom also rests upon a characteristically third-wave 
expectation of gender-neutral bargaining power or, perhaps, more 
accurately in the artificial insemination context, biological sex-driven 
sharing of it. The statute as drawn and enforced by the majority aims 
to facilitate not only what a given individual wants but what she or he 
needs to maximize family or non-family potential. 
The upshot: under a statute such as that operating in Kansas, any 
woman or donor choosing to participate or not to participate in an 
artificial insemination procedure is not controlled by gender-based 
presumptions of parentage or any other person's estimation of the one, 
true set of "feminist 'values. ,,,67 This means that certain types of law 
reform may be consistent with and conducive to further development 
of third-wave feminist ideals. We are reminded of Gloria Steinem's 
famous vision: "We are talking about a society in which there will be 
no roles other than those chosen or those earned; we are really talking 
about humanism." 
67 See Ferguson, supra note 33, at 133. 
